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Another cycle of procedural innovation has begun. Under the label of Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and with a fresh spirit of reform it will
change civil procedure by increasing the alternatives to adversarial litigation.
Jury trial inevitably seems to mean adversarial procedure, and the seventh
amendment preserves a right to jury trial for federal court resolution of "suits
at common law. '"1 What effect will the seventh amendment and ADR have on
each other? Will the seventh amendment preserve civil jury trial for a litigant
who wants to resolve a common law dispute in that adversarial manner?
Should it do so? Will ADR produce a change in the interpretation of the
seventh amendment?
The ADR label sweeps broadly and yet may include every new procedural
proposal, but certain ideas represent the core concept.2 Within the past few
years there have been growing complaints that the United States has exper-
ienced an explosion of litigation and regulatory disputes that have seriously
overloaded the courts and proven to be a very costly method of conflict resolu-
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. Research for this article was sup-
ported by a grant from the National Institute for Dispute Resolution and by a grant
from the Ross McCollum Fund.
I.
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2. For general information about Alternative Dispute Resolution see CENTER
FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 1982; A.B.A. Special
Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution, CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION: Ex-
PLORING THE ALTERNATIVES (1983); J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON, & P. SZANTON, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN AMERICA: PROCESSES IN EVOLUTION (1984); 1 CENTER FOR PUBLIC
RESOURCES, WORKING TAXONOMY OF ALTERNATIVE LEGAL PROCESSES: PTS I-IV, AL-
TERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Nos. 5, 8, 11, 12 (May, Aug., Nov.,
Dec. 1983); Green, Getting Out of Court-Private Resolution of Civil Disputes, 28
BOSTON B.J. il (1984); see also Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Law Curricu-
lum, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229 (1984).
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tion. 3 Along with the complaints came the diagnosis that overattention to ad-
versarial litigation had blinded lawyers and their clients to the advantages of
other methods of dispute resolution.
The original focus of ADR was educating parties to recognize their self-
interest in avoiding adversarial litigation, so many ADR ideas and procedures
are either voluntary efforts of a single party or depend on the mutual agree-
ment of all parties. These include dispute avoidance, dispute management, cre-
ative forms of voluntary settlement, the mini-trial, consensual reference to a
private judge, contractual or voluntary arbitration, and mediation. The sub-
stantial merit of each of these ideas may have been overlooked in the past
because of a focus on formal litigation and the ADR movement may increase
the extent they are used, but voluntary usage of these kinds of ADR proce-
dures does not create any serious seventh amendment issue.
The attractiveness of ADR is not limited to parties pursuing their self-
interest. Judges faced with growing dockets and legislators seeking ways to
reduce the cost of providing dispute resolution are also attracted by the prom-
ise of more civil dispute resolution without an increase in federal judicial re-
sources. ADR could be supported by federal creation and subsidy of an ADR
facility for parties to use without having to create their own procedure.
Broader usage of ADR can be encouraged by educating parties about alterna-
tives to civil litigation and suggesting they try to resolve the dispute in a
nonadversarial manner. Where the parties are free to choose between the
ADR procedure or court litigation, there is again no seventh amendment issue
even if there is federal support and encouragement for the ADR procedure.4
A seventh amendment issue could arise when education, encouragement,
or facilitation are replaced by requirement, and a party previously entitled to a
jury trial in federal court is forced to accept a substitute. Such substitutes to a
traditional federal court jury trial that fit under the ADR label might include
involuntary arbitration,5 mandatory settlement procedures,6 summary trials,'
3. See, e.g., Bell, Crisis in the Courts: Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L.
REV. 3 (1978); BURGER, Isn't there a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Breger,
The Justice Conundrum, 28 VILL. L. REV. 923 (1983). As the literature developed, the
early one-sided diagnosis of an overly adversarial society and the uniform condemna-
tion of adversarial dispute resolution has been examined in greater depth. E.g., D.
TRUBEK, J. GROSSMAN, W. FELSTINER, H. KRITZER & A. SARAT, CIVIL LITIGATION
RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (1983); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073 (1984); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4
(1983); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litiga-
tion, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983). Even if analytical studies demonstrate that there is
not an excessive level of adversarial litigation, the ADR movement appears to have
enough strength that it will not be untracked by factual research.
4. There may be an article III issue if the federal ADR facility looks too much
like a court. See infra text accompanying notes 49-60; see also Schor v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 740 F.2d 1262, 1268-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
5. See D. HENSLER, A. LIPSON & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALl-
[Vol. 1985
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SEVENTH AMENDMENT
and new tribunals outside the article III courts.8 In past rounds of reform,
many new procedures have been created or adapted as part of new substantive
law, without taking much of the traditional litigation from the courts. The
threat to jury trial was not as apparent and perhaps not as major. The ADR
movement's hallmark is an implicit challenge to justify formal litigation of
every dispute, even those traditionally tried in court. This approach could pro-
duce a major impact on the seventh amendment.
The seventh amendment problem is not within the ADR procedures
themselves, but rather in how ADR is integrated into the total system of for-
mal dispute resolution. Proponents of ADR may not intend to destroy federal
civil jury trial, but ADR could be a serious threat to the seventh amendment if
alternative procedures supplant civil jury trial and leave the constitutional lan-
guage as a hollow shell. On the other hand, substantial use of ADR would not
necessarily threaten seventh amendment values if jury trial remains available;
instead, ADR procedures in routine litigation might protect the role of the
civil jury in nonroutine litigation. Current seventh amendment doctrine does
not provide a complete frame-work for analyzing the serious issues raised by
ADR. This article attempts to forecast and analyze the important effects,
risks, or benefits of ADR for the seventh amendment. As a result there are
more questions and tentative suggestions than firm conclusions.
II. FRAMING THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT ISSUE
The fundamental principle of the seventh amendment is citizen participa-
tion in government by jury service. Yet, there is substantial room for ADR
procedures. The Constitution does not require that parties have a dispute, that
they resolve it with a publicly supported procedure, that they resolve it in an
adversarial manner, or that they use a federal forum. Even for formal civil
dispute resolution, the image of the solemn courtroom with a presiding judge
FORNIA (1981); E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRA-
TION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Center rev. ed. 1983); E.
ROLPH, INTRODUCING COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION (1984); Levin, Court-Annexed
Arbitration, 16 U. MICH. JL. REF. 537 (1983); Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed
Arbitration in the Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REV. 787
(1983).
6. See, generally J. CECIL & B. MEIERHOEFER, REPORT ON THE MEDIATION
PROGRAM IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN (1983); K. TEGLAND, MEDIATION
IN THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON (1984); Cooley, Could Settlement Mas-
ters Help Reduce the Cost of Litigation and the Workload of Federal Courts?, 68
JUDICATURE 59 (1984).
7. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JU-
DICIAL SYSTEM, THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 7-11 (1977); Erickson, The
Pound Conference Recommendations. A Blueprint for the Justice System in the
Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 285-86 (1978).
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and a jury of peers is no longer the dominant model. Since civil dispute resolu-
tion at the federal level is already divided among a host of procedures in addi-
tion to jury trial, ADR will only increase the variety of options.
Whether any particular ADR procedure violates the seventh amendment
language or undercuts the constitutional concept, and how it might do so, is
not always immediately apparent. The constitutional language is sparse, the
historical precedent is limited, policy choices quickly become paramount, and
the implications of initial reforms may be unclear. The history of the seventh
amendment indicates the framers' memory of the revolutionary experience
when jury nullification was used to defeat royal efforts to enforce trade acts.9
It is clear the supporters of the seventh amendment wanted something more
than accurate or efficient fact-finding from the civil jury, but the framers' the-
ory was not well-developed and the potential conflict between jury nullification
and due process was not addressed."0 The jury's role has changed as the rele-
vance of the original intent has receded, but even after two centuries the defi-
nition of the proper role of the jury is still an open issue. Some of the policy
issues must be addressed in the evaluation of ADR; if they are not, they may
be resolved by default as ADR is implemented.
When comparing jury trial and ADR, various reasons explain why an
ADR procedure may appear more appropriate than trial for a particular dis-
pute. Some disputes may seem of lesser consequence and deserve only a minor
amount of resources to resolve. Some may require specialized knowledge and
appear most efficiently resolved by an expert. Some resolutions may be more
stable if reached cooperatively. Finally, some resolutions may appear more fair
to the parties if resolved in a nonadversarial manner. The attraction of ADR
comes from specialization, with each dispute theoretically channeled to an op-
timal procedure.
Civil jury trial presents a clear contrast with the specialization of ADR.
In small cases jury trial costs more than the amount in dispute. In complicated
cases definition and explanation of the issues requires substantial time and
effort. The jury is too unwieldy and temporary to mediate in an ongoing rela-
tionship. The jury's inability to create an independent result limits it to select-
ing between adversarial positions. In contrast to the specialization of ADR,
civil jury trial, with a judge, counsel, and adversarial parties, can be best de-
scribed as dispute resolution by a generalist.
The disadvantages of jury trial are highlighted by the contrast with ADR
specialization, while the advantages may not be immediately apparent. The
seventh amendment guarantee of civil jury trial established constitutional pro-
tection for policy reasons that are broader than whether the jury is better,
9. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
1281, 1320-1328 (1978). See generally Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973).
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more efficient, or less expensive than an alternative in a particular case. The
advantages claimed for civil jury trial include: it maintains flexibility in the
substantive law; it provides an unbiased hearing for a party with a nontradi-
tional idea; it minimizes the appearance of official indifference or corruption; it
brings a fresh perspective and sees the individual character of each case; it
acts as the conscience of the community; it is a better fact finder; it under-
stands emotions better; it can better assess damages; it educates citizens about
government; and it is a symbol of democracy. 1
The common feature of all the asserted advantages of jury trial is that
none is very important all the time, but some are important much of the time
and any of them could be very important in a particular case. The framers of
the seventh amendment wanted most federal court litigation resolved by jury
trial, even though that meant that in many, or even most, trials the jury's role
would be unremarkable, of some value but not often critically significant. The
added expense, delay, inconvenience, or occasional wrong verdict were an ac-
ceptable price for the political value of citizen participation. Now almost two
centuries after the ratification debates, bench trials in federal court outnumber
jury trials and other federal forums resolve a tremendous volume of disputes. 2
There may be no formal policy definition of the proper extent of jury
trial, but modern practice suggests a working consensus that jury trial should
resolve only a small percentage of disputes, although the narrow niche re-
served for the civil jury should be protected by the Constitution. However, this
consensus is fragile and uncertain and ADR will test the limits and strength of
the consensus. How can we avoid confusing the jury's current or conventional
role with the constitutional mandate? Is it possible to develop a stable consti-
tutional doctrine, or is Congressional discretion the only practical way to en-
force this constitutional provision?
I think it would be a mistake to expect to find clear answers from the
traditional historical test. For most seventh amendment issues, the Supreme
Court has determined the extent of the constitutional guarantee by application
of an historical test based on the practice in existence in 1791 when the Bill of
II. See generally C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY (1962); R. SIMON,
THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA (1975); Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or
Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386 (1954); Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5
VAND. L. REV. 150 (1952); Green, Juries and Justice-The Jury's Role in Personal
Injury Cases, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 152; Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil
Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47 (1977); Kirst, supra
note 10, at 26-32; Nejelski, The Jeffersonian-Hamiltonian Duality: A Framework for
Understanding Reforms in the Administration of Justice, 64 JUDICATURE 450 (1981);
Renfrew, The Vital Role of the Jury, 3 LITIGATION, Winter 1976, at 5; Summers,
Some Merits of Civil Jury Trials, 39 TUL. L. REV. 3 (1964).
12. In the twelve months ending June 30, 1984 there were 5,555 jury trials and
6,525 nonjury trials in the federal courts. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Table C4 (1984).
1985]
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Rights was adopted.1 3 Within the court system the historical test has been
workable, even though occasionally rough at the edges. The law-equity test
has served to define the right to jury trial in actions that did not exist in
1791.4 But there the only choice, assuming an actual trial, is between adver-
sarial jury trial and adversarial bench trial, procedures of the same order of
magnitude". The historical test can be applied by analogy to evaluate a new
trial procedure that did not exist in 1791.16 The dispute is still in court, so it is
only necessary to evaluate the impact of the new procedures on the roles of
judge and jury. With ADR the issue is more complex because the alternative
is not even a court, but can be a procedure of a different order of magnitude.
The recent debate over the complexity issue demonstrates the futility of histor-
ical research to find an answer on an issue such as ADR that is so far removed
from English practice in 1791. The historical test will simply evaporate under
the pressure if expected to prove whether an ADR procedure had a 1791
analog.
The historical test suggests that the answer to a modern problem can sim-
ply be "found" in the past, an approach that conceals the broadly political
nature of the problem. The real value of the historical approach is not in the
narrow analogies it may supply, but in the reminder that there were complex
and inconsistent reasons for adoption of the amendment, reasons that still pro-
duce substantial disagreement on the underlying policy issues. What is the role
of the jury? What is the purpose of civil dispute resolution? Resolution of
disputes is not an adequate description of the purpose, because the method
may be as important as the result. Accurate resolution of all disputes is an
unrealistically narrow goal; finding what happened is only one step in the pro-
cess of resolving a dispute. The goal is not to resolve disputes at minimal dol-
lar cost; that overemphasizes measurable costs and ignores the benefits and
other costs that may be difficult to quantify.
If the effect of ADR involves too many policy choices for a mechanical
historical test, the initial response might be to create a new test. A better
approach is to begin with a more open-ended policy analysis, not to first create
a test in hopes it will address the policy concerns. Whether any approach can
protect the civil jury role from ADR, or whether there should be an articu-
lated test, depends in part on the answers to the question asked in the next
section. It may appear improper to suggest that constitutional doctrine should
follow pragmatic concerns, but in fact the current interpretation of the seventh
amendment is heavily influenced by judicial perceptions of the value and abil-
ity of the civil jury.
The comparison between jury trial and ADR must be tempered by the
13. See Wolfram, supra note 9, at 639-44.
14. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189 (1974).
15. Kirst, supra note 10, at 12-26.
16. Id. at 4-10.
[Vol. 1985
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caution that the proponents of ADR have the advantage of all reformers. The
theoretical successes of ADR do not have to be discounted by the real
problems of practical administration. A cadre of dispute resolvers can be as-
sumed to be more capable and less expensive than the current body of federal
judges. The array of ADR procedures can be called a blessing, with the sim-
plifying assumption there will be an effective procedure for channelling each
dispute to the correct type of procedure. The possible loss of prestige and au-
thority of the current federal courts can be ignored, while the long-term public
acceptance of the new forum can be taken for granted. The value of public
participation in civil litigation can be assumed to be de minimis and ignored.
The seemingly inevitable routinization of most procedural reforms in a bu-
reaucracy can be left for the next generation of reform. The availability of
voluntary professional time or litigant ability to pay the full cost of dispute
resolution can be presumed, minimizing any governmental obligation to pro-
vide dispute resolution as an essential public service. In contrast, the success of
jury trial may be hard to quantify while the costs and problems are easily
illustrated.
I11. WHEN IS JURY TRIAL BETTER THAN ADR?
A. Illustrations from McDonald v. City of West Branch
The working hypotheses that support this article are that there is a dis-
tinction between cases best suited for jury trial and cases for which jury trial
is less necessary, that seventh amendment doctrine should be influenced, al-
though not controlled, by that distinction, that it is possible to develop a prac-
tical definition of the distinction, and that the long run viability of the amend-
ment will be better preserved by a political approach than by an attempt to
follow an historical test. These hypotheses about constitutional policy cannot
necessarily be proven or disproven, certainly not by citation of precedent, but
their validity can be tested by analogy and illustration.
A recent example that helps illustrate where jury trial might be superior
is the Supreme Court's recent opinion in McDonald v. City of West Branch.17
As framed by the Court, the question in McDonald was whether a federal
court hearing a section 1983 action may accord preclusive effect to an unap-
pealed arbitration award that found no factual basis for the complaint. No
statute obligated the courts to give preclusive effect, so the issue was a policy
choice between litigation in court and collective bargaining arbitration, a type
of ADR procedure. The Court concluded that there should be no preclusive
effect, because that would "undermine the statute's efficacy in protecting fed-
eral rights."'18 In a later opinion the Court summarized the holding of McDon-
ald,- "civil rights actions ... belong in court,"' 9 even if not necessarily in a
17. 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
18. Id. at 1803.
19. Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2930 (1984).
1985]
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federal court.
The Court's description of McDonald's section 1983 claim concentrated
on factors that supported access to the courts: an arbitrator may be a nonlaw-
yer without expertise in resolving complex legal issues, the arbitrator has lim-
ited authority to enforce public law, the employee's access to the forum is not
guaranteed because access is controlled by the union, and arbitral fact-finding
is not equivalent to judicial fact-finding. On the other hand, the Court did not
hold that access to court would always assure a new opportunity to relitigate
the issues. Many employment grievances, whether framed as collective bar-
gaining violations or section 1983 claims, are factual disputes without complex
legal issues, where the. employee is allowed sufficient access to the forum and
given procedural fairness under a bargaining agreement which is not inconsis-
tent with the civil right statutes. In short, because many of these disputes in-
volve routine matters, such as the reason the employee was discharged, the
complaining employee should not be permitted to have a full scale relitigation
of the arbitrated issues.
In McDonald the Court expressly stopped short of deciding what effect
the trial judge should give the arbitration decision, remanding to the Sixth
Circuit with no mention of the actual procedure used in the McDonald trial
and only a footnote explanation that the weight given the arbitration decision
must be determined in the court's discretion.2" At the original McDonald trial,
the evidence included the arbitration decision along with evidence by both
sides about whether the arbitration hearing had been an adequate forum.2'
This procedure made the weight to be given the arbitration decision an issue
of fact for the jury. The Sixth Circuit decision held that the weight given the
arbitration decision was an issue of law by requiring full preclusive effect. 2 In
remanding to the Sixth Circuit the Supreme Court gave no guidance on
whether the weight given the arbitration decision was an issue of fact or an
issue of law, or if some combination of the two, how the issues should be iden-
tified and decided. There is a constitutional right to a jury trial in a section
1983 action for damages, but only if there is a disputed issue of fact.2 3 The
judges could still restrict the jury's role by treating the weight to be given an
arbitration award as an issue of law or by allowing the jury to decide only a
narrower factual issue.24
20. McDonald, 104 S. Ct. at 1804 n.13.
21. Brief for Petitioner at 6, McDonald, 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
22. 709 F.2d 1505 (6th Cir. 1983). The opinion was unpublished, but is in-
cluded in the Petition for Certiorari, Appendix A, McDonald, 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
23. See Hildebrand v. Board of Trustees, 607 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1979);
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 829 (2d Cir. 1977); Drone v. Hutto, 565 F.2d
543, 544 (8th Cir. 1977).
24. The court also postponed reaching that issue in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1243-44 (1985). Subsequently, one court affirmed a prior
arbitration decision precluding a RICO claim. Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1360-62 (1ith Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 1985
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The broader issue of McDonald on remand is relevant to the comparison
of ADR and jury trial. Is there some way to establish final resolution of a
substantial percentage of cases outside the courts, while still allowing certain
litigants to have access to the courts? Access to the courts could allow jury
trial of the facts, and jury trial may be the best resolution if the case presents
a novel approach, or it requires findings of intent or motive, or an evaluation
of emotional issues, or it involves an issue of community standards. As Mc-
Donald illustrates, the Court has only partially examined the optimal relation-
ship between the courts and other dispute resolution procedures.2 5
B. Resolution of Nonroutine Disputes
For descriptive convenience, the cases most appropriate for jury trial
might be labelled nonroutine, with those where jury trial is less essential la-
belled routine. The distinction between routine and nonroutine litigation does
not have to be analytically rigorous; the immediate goal is to illustrate and
discuss the issues that ADR creates for the seventh amendment, rather than
create a mechanical test. The use of only two labels should not suggest that all
cases can be classified into only one of two categories; in fact, the two labels
represent polar positions on a continuous distribution. The distinction is useful
for developing seventh amendment doctrine because there is some precedent to
rely on for guidance. The same factors that make a case nonroutine and ap-
propriate for jury trial have been considered by judges for centuries in defining
the relative power of judge and jury. Whether an issue should be one of fact or
law, how much the jury's fact-finding should be constrained or left indepen-
dent, how much evidence should be required to defeat summary judgment or
directed verdict, or when a new trial should be ordered on the weight of the
evidence all involve the issue of the jury's role.
An area of litigation that illustrates the distinction between routine and
nonroutine cases is the asbestos litigation. 6 Asbestos litigation became a ma-
jor burden on some court dockets because the parties did not make sufficient
use of alternatives to trial. Recently, the potential for use of ADR procedures
has been recognized and ADR techniques have been formally established.
From one perspective, asbestos litigation is routine product liability litigation
and injured plaintiffs and defending companies should be able to settle a large
percentage of the cases without trial. In practice, settlements did not occur at
25. See Kirst, supra note 10, at 32-36.
26. See J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER & M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF As-
BESTOS LITIGATION (1983); J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, G. HAGGSTROM &
M. SHANLEY, VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES
(1984); NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION WORKING
GROUP ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, FINAL REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1984); T.
WILLGING, ASBESTOS CASE MANAGEMENT: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES ( );
Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its Promise: An Ex-
amination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141, 152-71 (1984).
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the typical rate in asbestos cases because of unusual uncertainty caused by the
very long time between exposure to the product and visible injury and the fact
that the defect was not in just an occasional product but in the whole output
of the industry. Early asbestos cases were nonroutine and only after some were
tried could the parties and courts develop the legal theories, learn jury reac-
tions to the liability evidence, see how juries would evaluate and compensate
various disabilities, and see whether trial and appellate judges would accept,
reject, or modify the jury verdicts.
The burden of asbestos cases in certain courts highlighted the fact that
the information from the early cases did not produce an increasing number of
settlements. The formal ADR procedures which have now been established for
asbestos cases may handle a large percentage of the remaining cases.17 Even if
they don't, they will be valuable if they are the impetus to less formal settle-
ments. This does not mean that all the remaining cases should be resolved
with an ADR procedure. Although many of the remaining cases may be rou-
tine, with liability and damage issues fairly predictable by both sides within a
range where settlement is possible, some will still be nonroutine, either on
damages or liability, because all the issues are not yet settled.28 A major prob-
lem is the lack of a precise classification scheme to determine which cases
really should be resolved by jury trial.
Another illustration of the difficulty in identifying which cases should be
resolved by a jury is the issue of damage assessment, often said to be uniquely
within the competence of the jury. The issue is complicated because often as-
sessing damages is a routine matter, but any one of several reasons may make
an otherwise routine case novel and nonroutine. What should be the general
level of damages; for example, how much should a plaintiff receive for loss of a
limb? Even ignoring inflation, a century ago the award for loss of enjoyment
and reduced function would have been a fraction of current awards. Individual
loss had to be endured, medical science offered little rehabilitative support,
and there was little collective responsibility. Today, the loss presents a greater
contrast because medical science can do more and there is a stronger sense of
collective responsibility. Jury verdicts reflect society's views of the general
level. This is one area where each jury verdict makes a small contribution, but
no individual verdict is critically important; therefore, a jury verdict in every
routine case is not essential. Jury verdicts in only a small percentage of all
cases are sufficient to establish the general level of damages because those
verdicts give litigants information about a range within which they can settle
most cases.
In evaluating a particular plaintiff's case there are two questions-a fac-
tual question of the extent of injury and a comparative question relating this
plaintiff to others in a similar situation. On the factual question, the jury can
be valuable in evaluating the close cases; whether disability or pain prevents
27. See ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Mar. 1985, at 1.
28. Cf Green, supra note 25, at 215-24.
[Vol. 1985
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employment or seriously decreases the enjoyment of life depends on a notion
of how much a person should struggle with adversity before being considered
"deserving" of compensation or assistance. The comparative issue is usually
masked by other issues, but the jury seems generally less adept at handling the
comparative assessment.2 9 A jury is given little guidance on assessing general
damages and not allowed to know how similar cases have been handled by
other juries. Instead, the federal courts use indirect alternatives, such as remit-
titur or a new trial for inadequate damages. The indirect control makes many
cases routine because the parties know a verdict outside the established range
will not stand; therefore, the routine cases are more likely to settle because the
parties' settlement ranges will overlap. The hard, nonroutine cases where the
parties strongly disagree on how the jury will evaluate the opposing conten-
tions can only be resolved by a jury verdict.
The argument for a jury role in resolving nonroutine cases is buttressed
by experience with procedures designed to exclude completely the chance for
jury trial. Worker compensation procedures are a classic example. The basic
approach was a tradeoff of fixed compensation amounts for employer liability
without the common law defenses, adjudicated in an alternative forum outside
the courts. In recent decades, the lag in compensation levels under mandatory
ceilings led to increased efforts to find an alternative source of adequate com-
pensation. One fruitful source was the growing area of product liability litiga-
tion, which brought employment accident litigation back into the courts. Ac-
cess to courts and juries, expanded theories of liability, and increased damage
awards had a visible effect in the product liability insurance crisis of the
1970's. The "crisis" was in part a reflection of changed attitudes about the
level of protection from product injuries our society thought was proper for
employees and consumers. There is a continuum of possible levels of protec-
tion, from suffering in silence to full compensation and rehabilitation. The
change was not the problem; the problem was the speed of the change, a speed
partially due to worker compensation procedures that applied outmoded stan-
dards. The political process did not keep worker compensation procedures in
line with contemporary standards, and the jury input that could have done so
was excluded. The same scenario may be repeated in medical malpractice liti-
gation, as statutory maximum limits on damages create pressure to avoid them
where they are clearly inadequate.3 0 This pressure to change can get stronger
over time and eventually bring changes that appear radical because they occur
so quickly after the artificial limits are avoided.
29. A recent study provides quantitative evidence of unequal treatment in jury
damage awards. A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS, WHO
WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (Rand 1985).
30. See, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of appeal) (arguing Court should determine constitutionality
of damage limitation in medical malpractice cases).
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C. The Complexity Problem
If the civil jury's most important political role is the resolution of nonrou-
tine disputes, should jury trial be available for complex disputes? There is
strong pressure to eliminate the civil jury from complex litigation, 31 possibly
by replacing it with a formal ADR procedure.
Complexity of a factual dispute does not necessarily mean the jury will be
unable to resolve it or that ADR will be a better procedure. A jury of six or
twelve members of the lay public could probably never succeed if presented
with a complex factual issue, given no assistance, and told to create a solution.
If that were the task the only solution would be the expertise that could be
built into an ADR procedure. However, that is not the task. The jury is given
assistance from the legal rules which reduce an entire dispute into certain is-
sues, from the judge who narrows the case to those issues where the evidence
is in dispute, and from the lawyers and witnesses who explain the parties'
contentions.
The jury is not creating a solution, nor finding what happened. The jury is
selecting from the competing scenarios or hypotheses advanced by the parties
and deciding which is the most correct explanation.3 2 The jury may often
make the decision on the basis of collateral factors instead of a total under-
standing of the dispute, by selecting the explanation that makes the most
sense, accounts for more of the known variables, or is best explained by its
proponent. The jury verdict is much like the informed decision of a patient
consenting to major surgery-the patient may understand little of the medical
detail, and certainly could not perform the surgery, but can understand the
critical issues of need, risk, and probable success.
In both complex and ordinary litigation, the jury may well perform its
proper role even though there is great uncertainty about all the facts. The
surgery analogy also illustrates the problems of uncertainty and the relative
cost of reducing the uncertainty. In many surgery cases there is uncertainty
about the prognosis absent the surgery, the risk of the surgery, and the success
of the surgery. Some of that information cannot be made more certain, and
other information, such as the prognosis without surgery, can be obtained only
at an excessive price, delaying the surgery until it is too late. In the same way,
confidence in a jury verdict, or a decision in any dispute resolution, may be
reduced by uncertainty about the true facts because the cost of obtaining them
exceeds their value or they are no longer obtainable. Knowing more detail does
not necessarily mean a better grasp of the issues in dispute; sometimes the best
approach is what can be inelegantly described as an educated guess.33 Where
31. See the various materials cited in Kirst, supra note 10, at 1-2 nn. 2-6.
32. See Wessel, Comment, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION 245, 247-
48 (J. Nyhart & M. Carrow eds. 1983); Leigh, A Theory of Jury Trial Advocacy,
1984 UTAH L. REV. 763, 788-93.
33. See generally Wexler, Expert and Lay Participation in Decision Making, in
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all that can be presented at trial is inconclusive evidence requiring evaluation,
the jury's group evaluation of human nature may be the procedure that will
create the strongest confidence in the accuracy of the outcome.
D. Implications for Seventh Amendment Doctrine
Why should the constitutional protection guaranteeing civil jury trial for
all common law actions be weakened by conceding that the jury's role is most
appropriate in nonroutine cases, but perhaps less necessary or unnecessary in
routine cases? Will that approach to seventh amendment interpretation pro-
duce a constitutional doctrine that will preserve the meaning and spirit of the
amendment? Will it instead simply allow the courts and Congress to sidestep
the amendment and abolish civil jury trial without the trouble of repeal? Al-
though this is a serious risk, there is good reason to consider this approach.
Even though litigants actually insist on a jury trial in only a fraction of cases,
one ADR theme is that there are still too many jury trials. Some new ADR
procedures will have a coercive feature to force use of the alternative and re-
strict use of jury trial.
Any requirement that litigants use a formal ADR procedure instead of a
common law action in court will have to be integrated into seventh amend-
ment doctrine under some niche that justifies the denial of jury trial. Under
current doctrine the two niches most likely to be explored are the exception for
administrative litigation and the allowance of preliminary procedures as a pre-
condition to a jury trial. The consistent feature of administrative litigation is
the absence of a jury or any procedure by which the nonroutine cases can
reach a jury. In contrast, preliminary procedures such as court-annexed arbi-
tration could contain a path for nonroutine cases to eventually reach a jury.
Even if ADR is only another variation in persistent efforts to weaken or de-
stroy the right to jury trial,34 it may be better to adapt to the least onerous
alternative of mandatory preliminary procedures to avoid a complete loss of
jury trial through administrative resolution. The next two sections will con-
sider the administrative and preliminary procedure methods of implementing
ADR and explore how they differ in the implications of ADR for the seventh
amendment.
IV. VULNERABILITY? ADMINISTRATIVE RESOLUTION
Administrative resolution can be seen as part of the problem, but some
proponents will also see it as a method of implementing the ADR cure. Ad-
ministrative resolution can be as destructively adversarial as the courtroom
XVI NOMOs, PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS 186 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1975);
see also Newman, Re-Thinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 40
Record of the Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York (1985), reprinted as revised at
94 YALE L. J. 1643 (1985).
34. See Rheingold, Plastic Justice, LITIGATION, Spring 1984, at 3.
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litigation which gave birth to ADR, but it does offer maximum freedom to
create new procedures to implement various ADR proposals. Unfortunately,
administrative resolution is one area where the seventh amendment is particu-
larly vulnerable and jury trial can most easily be completely supplanted by a
nonjury alternative.
Could Congress implement ADR by creating an administrative Dispute
Resolution Center, provide within it a variety of dispute resolution procedures
other than jury trial, and transfer all common law litigation from the federal
courts to the administrative Center? 35 The administrative Center procedures
would have to comply with the due process requirements of the fifth amend-
ment, but the central issue here is whether the loss of any chance for a jury
trial would violate the seventh amendment. The courts have always held that
the seventh amendment does not directly apply to an administrative agency,36
so existing doctrine would not require such an administrative Center to use
jury trial, even though the effect would be a denial of jury trial. However, the
seventh amendment does indirectly limit Congressional power to assign dispute
resolution to such an administrative Center, for at least two policy reasons
that are rarely discussed.
The first reason the seventh amendment indirectly limits administrative
jurisdiction comes from the need to maintain the amendment as a viable con-
stitutional provision. If there were no limits on administrative jurisdiction and
if jury trial were required only in a court, then Congressional transfer of all
common law litigation to administrative resolution would leave the seventh
amendment a hollow shell. That would seem too clearly to violate the original
intent; it would appear too similar to the British creation of nonjury admiralty
jurisdiction in the colonies37 and it would too strongly emphasize the complete
absence of express constitutional authority for administrative resolution.
The second reason for an indirect limit is derived from the use of judicial
review of administrative action to satisfy article III and legitimate the admin-
istrative resolution.3 8 Even if the seventh amendment were inapplicable during
the administrative stage of the procedure, it could be interpreted to apply to
all levels and all functions of the federal courts. This interpretation would re-
quire jury trial of disputed fact issues at the judicial review stage. That would
complicate or eliminate judicial review on the basis of the administrative rec-
ord, as well as burden the courts of appeals with jury trials. Restricting ad-
35. This is only a slight variation on the "multidoor courthouse" concept that
has been much discussed. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 130-
33 (1976); see Ray, Creating the Courthouse of Tomorrow Today, 69 A.B.A. J. 170
(1984).
36. "[In] an administrative agency . . . facts are not found by juries." Atlas
Roofing v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 460 (1977).
37. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
38. See Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern
Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L. J. 197, 220-28.
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ministrative resolution within seventh amendment limits permits the judicial
review without a jury trial.
A related issue that is difficult to separate from the seventh amendment
issue is the extent to which article III limits the exercise of judicial power by
non-article Ill adjudicators."9 Article III issues have been very prominent re-
cently, with major litigation challenging the power of both bankruptcy
judges4 and federal magistrates.4 1 The article III and seventh amendment is-
sues are different, because article III can be satisfied in many cases by judicial
review in an article III court of the action of the non-article III forum.4 Since
article III judicial review is typically by judges sitting without a jury, article
III limits do not necessarily protect the seventh amendment right. The issues
are related, because if article III requires de novo litigation in district court,
the seventh amendment may require jury trial as well. As a result many of the
same arguments and precedents apply to both issues and interact in a manner
not yet clearly defined.
The seventh amendment issue was not prominent during the expansion of
the administrative process, even though the Revolutionary experience with ad-
miralty jurisdiction framed the basic issue of the jurisdiction of nonjury tribu-
nals. It did not appear that litigation was being diverted from the jury because
differences between the agencies and the English common law courts appeared
substantial. Early administrative action appeared closer to an extension of
functions of the executive or legislative branches. When an agency did adjudi-
cate private disputes, other issues appeared to be more importants and many
coercive agency powers required a de novo action in district court for enforce-
ment.44 The seventh amendment issue as a limit on administrative jurisdiction
was not directly addressed by the Supreme Court until 1977.
In Atlas Roofing v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion45 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the OSHA procedure
39. Id. at 204-08.
40. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982).
41. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984); see Note, Federal Magistrates and the
Principles of Article I1, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1947 (1984).
42. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
76-87 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
43. E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (seventh
amendment issue discussed only briefly at the end of an extensive opinion on congres-
sional power to regulate the area).
44. See Goldschmid, An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of Civil
Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, in 2 RECOMMEN-
DATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
896 (1973).
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against a seventh amendment challenge. In Atlas the Court for the first time
tried to define the seventh amendment limits on administrative adjudication,
creating a test from a mixed collection of earlier article III and seventh
amendment cases. The test stated by the Court was that nonjury administra-
tive adjudication was permitted "in cases in which 'public rights' are being
litigated-e.g., cases in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to
enforce public rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to en-
act ... "46 The "public rights" category was based on language from a nine-
teenth century opinion, but the language had only been used descriptively in
the prior opinion.47 Prior to Atlas the Court had not articulated the "public
rights" exception to the seventh amendment, and the precedents that were
available offered little guidance in defining the limits of the category.
The extent of congressional power to create new procedures under the
"public rights" administrative exception depends upon the limits the Court
will eventually define; at the moment there are only a few indications, and
they are inconsistent. Pre-Atlas dictum indicated very few seventh amendment
limits on administrative adjudication, more recent dictum suggests the Jus-
tices' indecision about whether to limit the "public rights" test to the Atlas
formulation, and lower court opinions show that court of appeals judges are
willing to further expand the test beyond the Atlas formulation.
The holding in Atlas was foreshadowed three years earlier by dictum in
two opinions that suggested that "statutory rights" could be assigned to ad-
ministrative adjudication. 48 "Statutory rights" were not defined, but appeared
to include any dispute within the district courts' federal question subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. The dispute in Atlas arose under a federal statute, and so
involved statutory rights, but the action was also being pursued on behalf of
the United States by a federal agency. The holding of Atlas appeared to cre-
ate a two part test of public rights, requiring both a valid federal substantive
statute and the federal government as a party in its sovereign capacity. How-
ever, the Atlas opinion did not indicate whether the "public rights" test re-
placed and limited the "statutory rights" test, or was only one subset of the
broader test.
The Atlas precedent reappeared in the Northern Pipeline4 opinions in
which the Court ruled on the constitutional objections to the jurisdiction of
bankruptcy judges and debated the extent of Congressional power to create
legislative courts or adjuncts to article III courts.50 There was no majority
46. Id. at 450.
47. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 284 (1856).
48. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
49. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982).
50. This was somewhat surprising as bankruptcy jurisdiction was solely an arti-
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opinion in Northern Pipeline, so implications of how the Court views Atlas
must be based on the plurality opinion of Justice Brennan and the dissenting
opinion of Justice White. 5
Justice Brennan's opinion52 offers limited solace that the public rights ex-
ception will be narrowly construed. The narrowest interpretation came in part
IIl of the opinion, in the discussion of whether the legislative court doctrine
could be constrained by "three tidy exceptions", one of which was the "public
rights" exception. In part III Justice Brennan described the test narrowly as
covering "only" disputes between the government and persons subject to its
authority, for a matter of public rights "must at a minimum" arise between
the government and others, and the presence of the United States as a proper
party "is a necessary but not sufficient means of distinguishing. 53 Justice
Brennan covered much of the same ground as Atlas, cited the Atlas opinion,
and in part II treated the "public rights" exception for article I courts the
same as the seventh amendment exception. That interpretation gives some
content to the seventh amendment exception, even if it inadequately addresses
the specific issue of jury trial. 4
However, in part IV of his opinion Justice Brennan interpreted Atlas even
more broadly. In discussing whether the bankruptcy court could be considered
an adjunct of an Article III court, he stressed that the "substantial discre-
tion"'5 5 of Congress to prescribe the manner of adjudication did not necessarily
permit Congress to use an Article I court to adjudicate all disputes arising
under federal statutes. But soon the theme was repeated with more emphasis
on the absence of a constitutional limit: "[W]hen Congress creates a statutory
right, it clearly has the discretion, in defining that right, to provide that per-
cle III issue and not a seventh amendment issue. Atlas had been expressly limited by
the Court to the seventh amendment issue when it granted certiorari only on the sev-
enth amendment issue, although the petition for certiorari had raised the article III
issue as well. 424 U.S. 964 (1976). It does show the interrelationship of the issues, even
if the Northern Pipeline opinions still leave the seventh amendment limits unclear.
51. iJustice Rehnquist's concurrence avoided the issue of the scope of the Atlas
test, but framed the issue well: "I need not decide whether these cases in fact support a
general proposition and three tidy exceptions, as the plurality believes, or whether in-
stead they are but landmarks on a judicial 'darkling plain' where ignorant armies have
clashed by night, as Justice White apparently believes them to be." 458 U.S. at 91.
52. Id. at 52.
53. Id. at 67-69 & n.23.
54. An example of the danger of tying the seventh amendment test to the arti-
cle III test is provided by the argument for increased authority for United States Mag-
istrates. See Burnett, Constitutionality of Consent Trials Before United States Magis-
trates-Pending Cases May Be a Potent Dynamic Force for Restructuring the Federal
Judiciary, 31 FED. B. NEWS & J. 27, 31-33. If the tests are the same, increased juris-
diction for magistrates would translate into a corresponding decrease in the right to
jury trial.
55. 458 U.S. at 80.
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sons seeking to vindicate that right must do so before particularized tribunals
created to perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right. ' '56
Justice Brennan then concluded the bankruptcy court was more than an ad-
junct to an Article III court, in part because the bankruptcy court was author-
ized to conduct jury trials. One implication is that Congressional discretion is
broad enough to permit administrative resolution of all statutory rights, as
long as the administrative agency does not look too much like a court, an
interpretation that gives little weight to seventh amendment policies.
Justice White's dissent57 argued that there were no fixed Constitutional
limits on what Congress could assign to article I courts. As his opinion
progressed, Justice White gave the civil jury ever decreasing protection from
Congressional action. Justice White started with a narrow definition: "public
rights-controversies between the government and private parties,"58 argued
for a more expansive interpretation: "virtually all the areas in which Congress
is authorized to act,"59 and then argued for no restraint at all: it "depend[s]
on the will of Congress and the reasons Congress offers ... "'
The Northern Pipeline opinions show the Court's internal disagreement
over whether to state a verbal formula that will give Congress some flexibility
to create new procedures and adjudicative bodies, and how to do so without
opening the door so wide .that there is no restraint at all. In recent opinions the
courts of appeals have relied on Atlas to uphold statutes in which Congress
has provided for administrative adjudication between private parties. This in-
dicates the Atlas test-that the government be a party in its sovereign capac-
ity in the administrative proceeding-has not yet succeeded in stabilizing this
area.
The first procedure to be challenged was the administrative reparations
proceedings under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act.6' A
complainant, typically an aggrieved patron, may file a complaint with the
Commission alleging a violation of the Act by a registered commodity profes-
sional. After a hearing the Commission can order that the respondent pay
damages; the further procedure for appeal and enforcement is analogous to
Atlas. The only appeal is a nonjury review in the Court of Appeals, but en-
forcement of a damage award is by the district court without retrial of the
award. The first element of the Atlas test is satisfied since the federal statute
is a valid exercise of Congressional power; the second element is not because
the government only provides a forum and is not in any sense a party. Never-
56. Id. at 83.
57. Id. at 92.
58. Id. at 103
59. Id. at 104.
60. Id. at 108.
61. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, P.L. 93-463, sec.
106, 88 Stat. 1389, 1393-95, codified at 7 U.S.C. 18 (1982).
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theless the denial of jury trial has been upheld under the Atlas rationale.62
Another procedure which has often been challenged is the arbitration of a
withdrawing employer's obligation to a multi-employer pension fund under the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act." The arbitration is not con-
tractual but imposed by the statute. Again the cause of action arises under a
valid federal statute but the government is not a party. The courts of appeals
considering the issue have uniformly held that Atlas permits nonjury resolu-
tion of this "public rights" issue.6 4
Examination of the federal district court statistics shows how vulnerable
the seventh amendment is to a broad "public rights" exception for administra-
tive resolution. Two-fifths of civil jury trials are in federal question litigation
between private parties. 65 Under a broad interpretation of the "public rights"
exception all of these could be transferred to a nonjury administrative forum,
with only judicial review on the record to satisfy Article III requirements. The
larger number of jury trials in diversity cases is equally at risk, even though
the state-created rights in diversity cases appear to be what the Court consid-
ers the core category of common law actions. 6 Elimination or restriction of
diversity jurisdiction is always possible, and the risk would increase if diversity
cases become the only civil litigation requiring jury trial. Alternatively, enact-
ment of proposals such as federal product liability legislation would create the
kind of federal statutory rights that could be assigned to a nonjury administra-
62. Myron v. Hauser, 673 F.2d 994 (8th Cir. 1982); see Markham, The Sev-
enth Amendment and CFTC Reparations Proceedings, 68 IOWA L. REV. 87 (1982).
63. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, P.L. 96-364, § 104,
94 Stat. 1208, 1239-40 codified at 29 U.S.C. 1401 (1982).
64. Keith Fulton & Sons v. New England Teamsters, 741 F.2d 451, 458-59 (1st
Cir. 1984); Terson Co. v. Bakery Drivers Local 194, 739 F.2d 118, 121 (3d Cir. 1984);
Washington Star Co. v. International Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan,
729 F.2d 1502, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye
& Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1984); Peick v. Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corp., 724 F.2d 1247, 1277 (7th Cir. 1983); Republic Indus. v. Teamsters Joint
Council No. 83, 718 F.2d 628, 642 (4th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court has noted the
issue but has not decided it. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Gray & Co., 104 S.
Ct. 2709, 2717 n.7 (1984).
65. For the twelve months ended June 30, 1984 there were 5,555 jury trials in
the following categories in federal district courts.




ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S.
COURTS, Table C4, (1984).
66. Cf. Redish, supra note 35, at 208-09 (in Northern Pipeline, Justice Brennan
considered that such suits, being at the core of the federal judicial power, must be
heard by an article IlI court).
19851
19
Kirst: Krist: Will the Seventh Amendment Survive ADR?
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
64 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
tive forum under a broad interpretation of the "public rights" exception.6"
Congressional efforts to restructure the bankruptcy courts to comply with
the Northern Pipeline opinion demonstrate how difficult it is to bring an al-
ready existing procedure into compliance when a different constitutional re-
quirement is articulated. The current uncertainty about the "public rights"
exception creates the risk Congress will exceed the intended limits of Atlas
before the Court can draw clearer boundaries, forcing the Court to either ac-
quiesce or risk procedural chaos." The greatest risk to seventh amendment
policy is that migration of the docket to administrative resolution will leave
the constitutional protection an empty promise. It is unlikely administrative
resolution will be abandoned, or even substantially altered, 9 but the vulnera-
bility of the seventh amendment policy should produce more careful considera-
tion of the effect of that method of implementing ADR.
V. REDEFINED ROLE? DIVERSION TO A PRELIMINARY PROCEDURE
Disputing parties can always reach a voluntary settlement or agree to an
alternative procedure for resolving a dispute and avoid litigation. That does
not mean they will because they may lack a sufficient incentive, even though
the expense of litigation and threat of an adverse verdict will often make liti-
gation less attractive. The burden and incentive may be unequal, or the parties
may incorrectly perceive their self-interest, or the private gain from litigation
may be much more compelling than the societal cost. Is there some way to
direct parties who only need a limited or less formal type of dispute resolution
into such a procedure, while still making jury trial available for those times
the jury will play its important role? Mandatory processing through a prelimi-
nary procedure before there can be a jury trial might accomplish that, espe-
cially if a large percentage of cases could be resolved without the jury trial.
The preliminary procedures to which a dispute is diverted may be attrac-
tive for different reasons. Some may be as adversarial as litigation but may
reduce public expense if many diverted disputes can be decided without using
judicial resources and only a few require resolution in the courtroom. Other
67. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 189 (2d ed. 1978); cf P.
BATOR, D. SHAPIRO, P. MISHKIN & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 399-400 (2d ed. 1973).
68. One recent proposal that would expand the application of the Atlas test is
the pending immigration reform bill. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1985, S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 121 (d)-(f), reprinted at 131 CONG. REC.
11750, 11753-54 (1985) (as passed by the Senate).
69. There may yet come a time to consider seriously how to incorporate jury
trial directly into judicial review of administrative action, providing a jury trial in a
district or appellate court where a factual dispute is the key issue in an adminiatrative
proceeding that is a substitute for a common law action. Jury trial in an appellate court
is not impossible; even the Supreme Court has held jury trials, Georgia v. Brailsford, 3
U.S. (3 DalI.) 1 (1795), and an issue could be referred for a jury trial.
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procedures may remove or dampen some of the adversarial pressure. Various
preliminary procedures already in use include: court annexed arbitration, court
annexed mediation, screening panels, settlement incentives, and the summary
jury trial. 70 Current seventh amendment doctrine may be vulnerable in this
area as well, but less so than for ADR implemented under the administrative
exception. A new concept- that jury trial is not an initial adjudication but
analogous to an appeal from an earlier resolution-may soon develop in fed-
eral litigation. The long run implications of that change are not clear, but the
seventh amendment policy might be as well or better protected.
The constitutional limits on preliminary diversion are not well-defined be-
cause the Supreme Court has considered the issue only once, almost a century
ago in Capital Traction Company v. Hof.71 The issue in that case was whether
a party could be forced to try a case to a jury before a justice of the peace,
with a right to a trial de novo on appeal before a judge and jury. The Court
held that the justice of the peace jury was not a jury in the constitutional sense
because the justice of the peace did not have the power of a common law
judge to control and direct the jury, and because a de novo trial on appeal was
not permitted by the seventh amendment. The jury before the justice of the
peace was considered a preliminary procedure to what would be the constitu-
tional jury trial in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia if either
party chose to appeal. Having established which jury trial satisfied the seventh
amendment, the Court considered whether the requirement of a first trial
before the justice of the peace and the posting of an appeal bond in order to
get a constitutional jury trial was permitted under the amendment. The Court
held that Congress has "considerable discretion" to require the preliminary
step "within reasonable bounds" as long as the right of trial by jury was not
"unreasonably obstructed. '72 Since Capital Traction there has been little re-
finement of the broad standard of reasonableness.
The reported federal court opinions that have considered the constitution-
ality of a diversion program have considered a program set up to reduce
docket congestion.7- The resulting emphasis on immediate need obscured
longer term issues, and most studies of effectiveness of diversion programs
have not considered the long-term effect on the availability of civil jury trial.74
For seventh amendment doctrine and policy, ordinary counting of the number
of cases resolved off the docket and those that return to the regular docket
cannot be the only measure of success. If the diverted cases are routine and
usual, perhaps most or all could be resolved by diversion without undercutting
70. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
71. 174 U.S. I (1899).
72. Id. at 44-45.
73. E.g., New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712
(E.D. Pa. 1983); Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
74. E.g., J. ADLER, D. HENSLER, & C. NELSON, SIMPLE JUSTICE, How LITI-
GANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1983).
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the seventh amendment policy. If the diverted cases are nonroutine or unusual,
a low percentage returning to the regular docket for trial would indicate a
serious risk to seventh amendment policy,
Some distinctions assist in defining or describing an "unreasonable ob-
struction" on the right to jury trial. First, preliminary procedures may be re-
quired for either predictive or substantive reasons.7 5 Predictive steps try to ed-
ucate the parties on what would most likely happen in an actual jury trial. The
assumption is that the predictive step is required to bring the parties' expecta-
tions into the mutual settlement range; while, without it they will not settle
because they or their lawyers lack information, or cannot objectively evaluate
the case. In contrast, substantive steps do not try to predict what a jury is
likely to do, but rather try to substitute a different outcome. Sometimes the
substantive effect is openly stated, other times it is not acknowledged. At the
moment it is enough to recognize the possibility without arguing whether it is
proper; this is simply another theme in the centuries old argument about
whether the proper role of the jury is broader than mechanical fact-finding.
Second, there are two ways of looking at the succession of possible proce-
dures, as either settlement in most cases followed by resolution at trial of those
not settled, or resolution of most cases by the preliminary ADR procedure
followed by resolution of the balance by trial.7 The traditional view has been
that there is only one actual dispute resolution, that which takes place at the
actual trial; any pretrial settlement is not a resolution but some kind of subsid-
iary step. Perhaps it is more accurate to consider any procedure a dispute
resolution procedure if it achieves a result in some disputes even if there is no
announced winner and some cases eventually go on to trial. Certainly the ver-
dict in a courtroom trial is a resolution, even though in some cases the litiga-
tion continues on appeal.
If the preliminary ADR procedure is seen as one form of resolution, then
in the later jury trial of those cases where trial is demanded the jury is provid-
ing a second decision by resolving again a dispute which has been resolved at
least once before. The difference between the predictive and substantive steps
becomes most apparent in the amount of coercion required to force parties to
use the preliminary procedure and the level of sanctions required to force the
parties to accept the initial result and not demand a trial.
A predictive step which appears accurate because it has a good track rec-
ord of forecasting actual verdicts will require little coercion to get substantial
use by all parties. On the other hand, an apparently inaccurate predictive step
will be avoided if possible because it will not provide useful information. A
75. See generally Abraham, Alternatives to the Tort System for the Nonmedi-
cal Professions: Can They Do the Job?, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 57, 74-84.
76. See generally THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: FINAL REPORT
OF THE COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS 81-94 (J. Lieberman ed. 1984); Murray,
Guideposts for an Institutional Framework of Consensual Dispute Processing, 1984
Mo. J. OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 45, 47-49.
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substantive step will be strongly resisted by the party it appears to disfavor. A
predictive step which is perceived as relatively accurate will lead to a substan-
tial percentage of final settlements even without a corresponding sanction for
demanding trial. A party's own additional costs from a trial will be enough to
compel settlement when it appears likely the final result will not be signifi-
cantly different from the prediction. Substantive steps perceived as inaccu-
rately predicting a jury verdict will add less to the parties' information and be
less likely to bring the parties into a settlement range. Therefore, a significant
sanction will have to be imposed, particularly on the party whom the proce-
dure disfavors, to encourage resolution by settlement and discourage that
party from trying for a better result from the jury.
In contrast to administrative resolution, preliminary procedures may be
less of a seventh amendment threat, because there is still the chance that the
case will get to the jury. The predictive procedure presents the least threat,
because the success of the predictive procedure is measured by the accuracy of
the predictions when tested by actual trial. The pattern of verdicts will educate
both the parties and the predictor on the accuracy of the predictions. The
substantive procedure is more of a threat; it works only if a higher cost for
jury trial or an increased risk of failure discourages the disfavored party from
trying to avoid the result by winning a better verdict from the jury.7" The
higher cost might be an increased filing fee, payment of the costs of the pre-
liminary procedure, or liability for substantial costs if the appealing party does
not improve its position in the jury trial. Reducing the chance the jury will
return a more favorable verdict has usually been accomplished by allowing
evidentiary use of the results of the preliminary procedure 8 or manipulating
the burden of proof required to upset the preliminary resolution.79
77. Diversion plans vary in the price of a de novo jury trial, such as payment of
the arbitrator's compensation in cases of compulsory arbitration of civil cases, PA. R.
CIv. PROC. 1308 (1984), deposit of the record costs accrued in the arbitration of medi-
cal malpractice cases, PA. R. Civ. PROC. 1804 (1984), deposit of a cost bond of $2000
by the losing plaintiff to pursue a medical malpractice action, MASS. GEN. L. ANN., ch.
231, § 60B (West 1985), possible liability for opponent's attorney's fees, W.D. WASH.
LOCAL Civ. R. (g)(12) (1981), or liability for actual costs at trial. Rhea v. Massey-
Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985).
78. The federal courts have found no seventh amendment violation in admitting
the report of a medical malpractice panel. E.g., Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
660 F.2d 146, 148-49 (5th Cir. 1981). See also, DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack
Memorial Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 290-91 (4th Cir. 1980) (federal policy on jury trial
procedure does not outweigh state interest in medical malpractice procedure).
79. Presumptions are one method of manipulating the burden of proof, and cre-
ation of a rebuttable presumption as the result of a prior proceeding does not violate
the seventh amendment. Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 430 (1915).
The issues raised by giving the preliminary procedure some effect, but not com-
pletely foreclosing relitigation of all issues, are the same as those left unresolved by the
Court in McDonald. See text accompanying notes 20-23, supra.
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Actually classifying a particular procedure as predictive or substantive is
more difficult than describing the categories, but the distinction can be helpful
in evaluating reform proposals. The medical malpractice disputes of the 1970's
illustrate that some procedural reforms may simply be a cover for attempts to
change the substantive law. Legislative motives are often mixed and indeter-
minate, and the same sanction can both discourage frivolous appeals from a
predictive procedure and coerce acceptance of a less acceptable result from a
substantive procedure. The debate over the pending proposal to amend Federal
Rule 68 illustrates the difficulty of resolving these issues. Rule 68 is an infor-
mally structured ADR variant which attempts to establish a procedure for
resolving cases that should settle and not be tried, by imposing sanctions on
parties who unreasonably refuse to settle. Rule 68 could operate alone, or in
conjunction with more formal ADR procedures such as court annexed arbitra-
tion or minitrials, with the sanction imposed on a party who refused to accept
the resolution of the ADR procedure.
As first proposed, amended Rule 68 attempted to define the sanction issue
fairly mechanically, measuring reasonableness of demanding trial by whether
the judgment was more favorable than the settlement offer, and making the
sanction automatic unless found by the court to be unjustified. 80 Initial objec-
tions that the first proposal too strongly denied some litigants access to court8'
led to its withdrawal. In the 1984 draft, all the mechanical tests were replaced
by a provision for judicial determination of whether the demand for trial was
unreasonable and the amount of any sanction. The 1984 draft had a list of six
circumstances to be considered in determining whether an offer was unreason-
ably rejected and a list of four factors to take into account in deciding the
sanction to be imposed. 82 Both the proposed rule and the comments ignore the
the standard of appellate review, leaving an open question whether the district
courts or the courts of appeal will shape the actual application of the rule.
The Rule 68 proposal certainly will generate a new round of debate and
controversy on many issues beyond the seventh amendment issue 83 but there
is clearly a potential effect on the seventh amendment. Proposed Rule 68
would add a potent, qualitatively different tool to the arsenal of procedures
available to the trial judge to deny a litigant a jury trial. Pleading decisions,
summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the ver-
80. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE U. S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1983), reprinted at 98 F.R.D. 339, 361-67 (1983).
81. See, e.g., Note, The Impact of Proposed Rule 68 on Civil Rights Litiga-
tion, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 719 (1984).
82. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, (1984), reprinted at 102 F.R.D. 425, 432-37 (1984).
83. See Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3019, 3027-35 (1985) (Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (arguing curent Rule 68 should not apply to at-
torney fees in civil rights litigation).
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dict, all can keep a litigant from getting or keeping a jury verdict, but only
where the record shows there is no issue of fact for the jury. A new trial can
overturn a jury's factfinding, but only where the proof is so weak the verdict is
against the great weight of the evidence; therefore, there will still be a second
jury verdict. Under proposed Rule 68 sanctions for demanding trial and "un-
reasonably" refusing to settle can be imposed, or potential sanctions
threatened, even if there is an issue for the jury, even if there is strong evi-
dence, and even if the party obtains a favorable verdict supported by the
evidence.
The extent to which the sanction denies the constitutional right to jury
trial, or the extent to which the demand for a jury trial should result in sanc-
tions, would depend upon the individual discretion of each judge and the indi-
vidual judge's belief in the strength of the historical policy supporting the sev-
enth amendment."' Even for those areas of seventh amendment doctrine where
policy choices are controlled only weakly by history and precedent, such as the
administrative proceeding exception or the law-equity analysis of a novel mod-
ern cause of action, the current doctrine is defined in appellate opinions and
relatively stable. The undefined judicial discretion to limit the seventh amend-
ment right in proposed Rule 68 does not appear to be an essential ingredient
for implementing ADR through diversion. The proposed discretion is simply a
reflection of an attempt to avoid a complex problem because of the difficulty of
precise definition.
If the price of a jury trial is too important to be left to individual judicial
discretion, what alternative approaches would best assure the right to jury trial
is not "unreasonably obstructed" by an excessive price? The price for demand-
ing trial could be a fixed amount or a price measured by the cost of the pre-
liminary procedure. Any cost above the normal filing fee appears to discrimi-
nate against poorer litigants and litigants with nonmonetary claims who may
be pursuing nonroutine claims that ought to be heard by a jury. The language
of the seventh amendment may be sparse, but pricing the jury trial beyond the
reach of most litigants would certainly violate the spirit of the amendment. If
the price of jury trial is measured by the actual cost of the preliminary proce-
dure or some average cost, it would be both relatively constant and more likely
to be reasonable, especially since the full value of the ADR procedure depends
on curtailing its cost. There might be some unnecessary jury trials, but it is
better to accept some overinclusion by trying a few cases where the premium
procedure is wasted in order to avoid the loss of citizen participation which
would result from underinclusion.
A completely different, or perhaps complementary approach, would re-
duce the attraction of the jury trial by increasing the chance it will not im-
prove the result. This could be done by adjusting the burden of proof as a
84. An omen of the future practice is Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d. Cir.
1985), where the court reversed a $2,480 sanction imposed by the trial court on a
defendant who was "dilatory" in making a settlement offer.
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result of the preliminary resolution without informing the jury of the result. It
could also be done by informing the jury of the first resolution and requiring
that it be followed unless shown incorrect, by a preponderance or more. This
procedural approach is neither novel nor unguided by precedent. Judges for
centuries have allocated the burden of proof, reallocated it with devices such
as presumptions, and taken over an issue entirely by calling it a question of
law. This procedural approach has the advantage of not directly pricing any
case out of jury trial so nonroutine claims could reach the jury.
The limited precedent on current preliminary procedures has found no
violation of the seventh amendment from any procedure that allowed a litigant
to have a jury trial after the preliminary procedure. The limits of reasonable
restrictions on jury trial have not been reached, and remain vague, but in the
long run the potential impact on the seventh amendment appears less serious
for this manner of implementing ADR.
VI. FUTURE ISSUES
The most uncertain implication of the ADR movement is the long term
effect it might have on the seventh amendment. ADR could supplant the civil
jury if administrative resolution became the model. In the alternative, the jury
might become a second level rather than first level dispute resolution proce-
dure if diversion to the preliminary procedures became the model. The differ-
ing implications of each model for the civil jury are rooted in differing as-
sumptions about the extent to which seventh amendment interpretation is a
political issue.
The administrative model exception is an offshoot of the classification side
of the historical test, a relative of the law-equity historical test. The applica-
tion of the test depends on finding an historical analogy to answer a modern
problem. Once the analogy is found and the absence of the civil jury justified
there is little reason to reexamine the historical tea leaves. A major problem
with this categorical approach is that the litigation appropriate for jury trial
cannot be pigeonholed according to neat historical distinctions.
The doctrine defining when preliminary procedures can be required has
less formal development, but the acceptance of reasonable limits on access to
the jury is analogous to the process of defining the relative roles of judge and
jury. Those roles are never frozen, but can vary over time as trial and appel-
late judges reconsider the role of the jury. Whether the price of demanding a
jury trial following a preliminary ADR procedure is monetary or a change in
the burden of proof, the effect of that price is more obvious than the price for
administrative resolution. The price of a jury trial is open to change to adjust
the proportion of cases reaching the jury. Of equal importance, the diversion
to preliminary procedures is a procedural rather than a categorical approach.
It permits any kind of case to be heard by the jury where one party believes it
is a nonroutine dispute, and better integrates the various procedures as com-
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plementary and not necessarily competitive.8
Even if all ADR is implemented through preliminary procedures with a
reasonable price for litigants who demand a jury trial, the ADR threat would
not disappear. There is some minimal level of usage necessary to keep jury
trial viable. Before increased use of ADR and decreased use of jury trial
makes the civil jury appear an expensive anachronism there is good reason to
continue efforts to make civil jury trial more efficient and useful. One possibil-
ity is to incorporate some lessons of ADR directly into jury trial, so an im-
proved civil jury system could better compete with alternatives in the market
for dispute resolution procedures.
One immediate possibility for incorporating ADR into the civil jury is
suggested by the experiments with the summary jury trial.86 The summary
jury trial procedure uses a nonbinding, half-day "trial" to a six member lay
panel. Counsel summarize the evidence without live witnesses and make their
arguments. The resulting verdict often provides a basis for settlement. 87 This
preliminary procedure is a relatively inexpensive predictive preliminary step;
any party can demand an actual jury trial but most do not.
The apparent success of the summary jury trial procedure suggests that
jury trials are overused to decide routine issues, such as the amount of dam-
ages in an ordinary injury case. The public cost and litigant cost may be
greatly reduced with the summary jury trial, but there is duplication in those
cases where a full trial results. Is there an intermediate position, allowing a
substantially shortened period for trial as the one and only jury trial required
by the seventh amendment? The leisurely pace of the typical trial would be
abandoned, critical issues would have to be highlighted and side issues ig-
nored, and trial practice would require different skills in effective communica-
tion, but there would still be the ability to get the citizen participation in the
business of the courts. 88
85. Bedlin & Nejelski, Unsettling issues about settling civil litigation, 68 JUDI-
CATURE 9, 29 (1984); Nejelski & Ray, Alternatives to Court and Trial, in THE IM-
PROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 263-65, 272-75 (F. Klein ed., 6th ed.
1981).
86. M. JACOUBOVITC14 & C. MOORE, SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN THE NORTH-
ERN DISTRICT OF OHIO (Federal Judicial Center 1982); Lambros, The Summary Jury
Trial, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1985); Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 43, 53-54 (1980); Comment, Recent Developments-Procedure: Summary
Jury Trials in United States District Court, Western District of Oklahoma, 37 OKLA.
L. REV. 214, 218 (1984); Special Supplement on Alternate Dispute Resolution in
Court, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Oct. 1984, at 4-13. The
United States Judicial Conference has endorsed experimental use of summary jury tri-
als. Judicial Conference Moves on Wide-Ranging Agenda at Fall Meeting,THE THIRD
BRANCH, Nov. 1984, at 3.
87. M. JACOUBOVITC14 & C. MOORE, supra note 86, at 7-9.
88. See Kirst, How to Find a Role for the Civil Jury in Modern Litigation,
__ JUDICATURE - (forthcoming 1986); see generally Rosenberg, Rient & Rowe,
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The status quo will not remain stable, and the actual or apparent effi-
ciency or inefficiency of jury trial will affect the scope of jury trial. The next
step appears to be further exploration of how the lessons of ADR can be used
to make jury trial more efficient. This step would make the ADR movement a
valuable experience for protecting seventh amendment policy.
Expenses: The Roadblock to Justice, JUDGES J., Summer 1981, at 16, 46.
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